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Introduction
Government departments are required to consider and 
report on the linkages between departmental outputs 
and the government’s intended outcomes (Steering 
Group Managing for Outcomes Roll-Out 2003/04, 
2002). But are the objectives of ‘managing for outcomes’ 
(MFO) being achieved? While, as Ryan (2006) noted, 
it may be too early to conclusively answer questions 
around MFO, it is possible to refl ect on the practice 
in light of the evidence available in departmental 
statements of intent (SOI).
It is unarguable that there should be accountability 
for outcomes. The objectives of the public sector are 
constitutionally determined by an elected government. 
Government must meet the needs of its electorate and 
those needs are ultimately served by the achievement of 
desired policy outcomes. It follows that accountability 
for outcomes should ultimately rest with the ministers 
who have contracted for the delivery of outputs which 
contribute to those outcomes. 
An important component of this debate is a clear 
understanding of accountability. The public sector 
in New Zealand has equated accountability with 
answerability (Gregory, 1998, p.529; Boston et al., 
1996, p.320). Answerability is in the same spirit as Gray, 
Owen and Adams’ defi nition of accountability as ‘the 
duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily 
a fi nancial account) or reckoning of those actions for 
which one is held responsible’ (Gray, Owen and Adams, 
1996, p.38).
Gregory and Hicks (1999) have subsequently argued 
that accountability in the sense of answerability is a 
narrow application of accountability and that this 
application may cause damage in the long term to 
public institutions, albeit while succeeding in delivering 
enhanced shorter-term accountability. They have 
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argued for recognition of responsible accountability, 
which incorporates ‘a willingness to answer honestly 
for standards of personal behaviour that enhance the 
real and apparent trustworthiness of public service’ (p.8, 
italics in original). Arguably, emphasis on a contracting 
environment undermines this sense of accountability 
from the public service.
Under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, 
ministers will be accountable for the actions of their 
departments (Pallot, 1998). Indeed, the public in New 
Zealand has continued to hold the political executive 
to account irrespective of subtleties within legislation. 
However, this does not absolve chief executives from 
providing accountability. Scott (2001) acknowledged 
that the doctrine as proposed by Palmer and Palmer 
(1997) has changed somewhat in practice:
Chief executives are now much more accountable 
for the delivery by their departments of specifi c 
services, and they can face severance or non-
renewal of contract on performance grounds 
alone. This is very different from the past, where 
performance was neither specifi ed nor measured, 
tenure was permanent and only gross and obvious 
failure was punished. (Scott, 2001, p.126)
MFO has led to at least one important unintended 
consequence: it has increased the accountability required 
by contracting departments and thereby at least by 
implication shifted accountability away from ministers. 
Public perceptions of failure to deliver may then result 
in blame resting with departmental chief executives, 
who are employed on fi xed-term contracts. Thus, chief 
executives can become the sacrifi cial lambs, and the 
risks they now face are exacerbated by the increased 
accountability which MFO demands of them. 
This article fi rst provides background on the reforms 
which have affected public sector accounting and 
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accountability, and then discusses the purpose of the 
‘Roll Out’ document in getting departments to report 
on their contribution towards governmental outcomes. 
The effects of MFO are examined using Children, Youth 
and Family Services (CYF) as an example. Finally, the 
article refl ects on the subtle but potentially damaging 
effects of shifting accountability away from the political 
executive. 
From cash accounting to accountability 
for outcomes
The traditional approach to allocating funds to 
government departments was through appropriations, 
with monitoring of the subsequent expenditure. This 
arguably resulted in a culture within government 
departments of spending up to the budget allocation, 
and a public perception that the public sector was 
not required to provide value for money. The type 
of restructuring carried out in the late 1980s and 
early 90s has since become known as New Public 
Management (NPM). NPM was introduced to counter 
the widespread belief that there was an excessive amount 
of waste in the ‘old’ system. As Norman and Gregory 
(2003, p.35) summarise, ‘the aim of these reforms was 
to focus the attention of public servants on results rather 
than bureaucratic procedures’. 
A key component of the reforms was to change the 
way that departmental budgets were allocated (Boston 
et al., 1996). Input allocations fostered the culture 
of spending up to the budgeted amounts. Replacing 
the previous input-based allocation was a model 
which recognised that inputs were provided to deliver 
outputs, which would result in government’s intended 
outcomes. The defi nitions of outputs and outcomes 
are a critical component of public management in 
New Zealand. 
Outputs and outcomes are defi ned in the Public Finance 
Act 1989. Outputs are defi ned as ‘goods or services that 
are supplied by a department, Crown entity, Offi ce of 
Parliament, or other person or body; and … include 
goods or services that a department, Crown entity, 
Offi ce of Parliament, or other person or body has 
agreed or contracted to supply on a contingent basis, 
but that have not been supplied’. An outcome is defi ned 
as a ‘state or condition of society, the economy, or the 
environment; and … includes a change in that state or 
condition’.
There is thus a clear distinction between outputs 
and outcomes. It is apparent that outputs are more 
measurable in nature, while outcomes hold more 
qualitative characteristics and are more complex 
in their composition. They are therefore much less 
amenable to measurement. The services of the police 
force are commonly used to illustrate the essential 
differences between outputs and outcomes. Inputs, 
under the traditional model, were the funds allocated 
to pay for expenses such as ‘offi cer hours’. An output 
for the police force is the number of arrests made, 
while an outcome of the police force may be a 
safe and law-abiding society. This simple example 
already begins to hint at the diffi culties that arise 
when attempts are made to measure outcomes. For 
outcomes, the relationship between cause and effect is 
also less obvious, particularly as outcomes frequently 
are affected by several outputs from various sources 
and by other external factors, over which government 
agencies may often have little if any control. Outcomes 
are signifi cant as the expression of government policy 
and fulfi lment of public expectations.
The State Sector Act 1988 introduced contractual 
arrangements  between the government and 
departmental chief executives. These ‘freed’ the 
executives to manage the inputs by removing 
restrictive detail from their budget allocations, while 
making them manage their outputs (Baehler, 2003). 
Chief executives received inputs and were expected 
to provide outputs, with ministers responsible for 
outcomes. The emphasis for chief executives and their 
departments was clearly and deliberately placed on 
the delivery of outputs.
Outputs are an appropriate level for accountability, as 
in most cases they can be measured in some manner. 
Indeed, the nature of a contract for outputs implies a 
shared understanding of the measures that are to be 
used. Outputs and, to a much lesser extent, outcomes 
became the focus of agreements between the ministers 
and their departments. The New Zealand Police, for 
example, contracts for a variety of outputs, including 
policy advice and ministerial servicing, general crime 
prevention services, specifi c crime prevention services 
and maintenance of public order, police primary 
response management, investigations, case resolution 
and support to judicial process, and the road safety 
programme (New Zealand Police, 2006). 
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Davis characterised bureaucracy under NPM as 
‘concerned not with some nebulous public good but 
with meeting performance indicators set out in an 
agency agreement’ (cited in Norman and Gregory, 2003, 
p.37). The business model that was used in shaping 
the reforms placed pivotal importance on performance 
management and reporting. 
Managing for outcomes: a paradox?
The State Services Commission (SSC) issued Managing 
for Outcomes in August 2002. The stated objective of 
Managing for Outcomes – to encourage departments to 
report on their contribution to governmental outcomes 
– attempts to shift government departments’ focus from 
outputs to longer-term outcomes. 
However, outcomes under the NPM model were not 
intended to be measurable – at least not in the way 
that MFO appears to require. Furthermore, MFO 
attempts to shift accountability from elected ministers 
to their departments. Paradoxically, the implementation 
of MFO may be leading to a shorter-term focus for 
outcomes rather than raising the timeframe for outputs. 
This is because the timeframe for outcomes is truncated 
by focusing on quantitative measures, by the diffi culties 
of effectively reporting the complexity inherent in 
outcomes and in holding chief executives accountable 
for outputs within their fi xed-term contracts. 
The SSC carries out its statutory roles of appointing 
and assessing the performance of public service chief 
executives, and investigating and reporting on matters 
relating to the performance of departments and 
providing guidance on the integrity and conduct of state 
servants. MFO seeks to improve the performance of the 
public service by changing the focus within departments 
from a one-year timeframe, driven by contracts with 
government and the budgeting process, to a ‘longer 
term, outcome-focused approach to management’ 
(Steering Group Managing for Outcomes Roll-Out 
2003/04, 2002, p.1). 
A key point is that departmental chief executives are 
not to be held accountable for achieving outcomes, but 
for ‘managing for outcomes’. This subtle distinction is 
critical to the implementation of MFO. Although the 
document states that chief executives were not to be 
made accountable for achieving outcomes, MFO does 
not state who, if anyone, should be accountable for the 
achievement of outcomes. The intention to manage 
outputs to ensure that they effi ciently and effectively 
contribute to the ultimate achievement of outcomes is 
laudable. But how realistic is it? 
The Managing for Outcomes document outlines the 
process departments must follow in determining how 
their outputs contribute to outcomes. The result of 
the process is the department’s SOI (Steering Group 
Managing for Outcomes Roll-Out 2003/04, 2002, p.6). 
This relationship, linking a long-term-focused process 
to a statement of one year’s duration, attempts to align 
short-term goals with longer-term outcomes. But it 
raises the question: has MFO resulted in a reduction 
in the scope or timeframe for outcomes?
The definition of outputs provided in the Public 
Finance Act ensures that they can be reasonably 
accounted for, while the defi nition of outcomes leaves 
them significantly less amenable to accountability. 
Modell (2005, p.58) states that ‘adequate measures of 
outcomes are pivotal for ascertaining the effectiveness 
of public-sector organisations’. While Modell supports 
outcomes as more important than outputs, outcomes 
are not widely used in accountability regimes. Modell 
acknowledges that proxy measures of outcomes tend 
to be closely linked to operating process considerations 
(p.63), which suggests that reporting is more closely 
linked with outputs than outcomes.
Modell’s assertion that outcomes are pivotal for 
ascertaining the effectiveness of public sector 
organisations raises the question: who should be 
accountable for them? The answer would seem to be 
that MFO requires greater accountability from the chief 
executives of the contracted departments. 
This situation can be illustrated by reference to the case 
of Children, Youth and Family Services.
MFO in practice: Child, Youth and 
Family Services
CYF was created as a government department in 1999 
and had statutory duties under the Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act 1989, including:
(a) advanc[ing] the wellbeing of families and the 
wellbeing of children and young persons as 
members of families, whanau, hapu, iwi, and 
family groups: 
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(b) mak[ing] provision for families, whanau, hapu, 
iwi, and family groups to receive assistance in 
caring for their children and young persons: 
(c) mak[ing] provision for matters relating to 
children and young persons who are in need of 
care or protection or who have offended against 
the law to be resolved, wherever possible, by their 
own family, whanau, hapu, iwi, or family group. 
(Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 
1989, preamble)
The department has multiple targets, and analysis of 
all of its objectives would provide more information 
than is needed in the present discussion. So CYF’s main 
function, the care and protection of children, will be 
used to illustrate MFO’s results. 
The output expense for care and protection services 
described in CYF’s 2006 SOI outlines discrete social 
work processes and activities as performance measures 
(see Appendix 1). Such processes and activities are 
unlikely to be considered a fi nal product or service 
that is delivered externally as the Public Finance 
Act’s output defi nition would require. This evidence 
supports Modell’s statement that proxies tend to focus 
on processes.
‘Outcome indicators’ are used by CYF and the Ministry 
of Social Development (MSD)1 in their respective SOIs. 
No reference is made in the Public Finance Act nor in 
MFO to outcome indicators, but it is apparent that 
outcome indicators are an intermediate step indicating 
how each departmental output contributes to eventual 
outcomes. The necessity for intermediate steps can lead 
to a shorter-term focus for outcomes.
The outcomes to which CYF contributes under 
its 2006 SOI are narrower than their previous 
defi nition, partly due to a major external review of 
CYF, which coincided with the introduction of the 
MFO environment. The focus has narrowed from 
the previous outcomes, which spoke of ‘children 
and young people [being] respected and valued 
and [having] a say in decisions that affect them’ 
(CYF, 2005, p.23). Now, they speak of ‘the safety 
and security of children and young people’ (MSD, 
2006), in line with recommendations from the 
Baseline Review. The 2006 SOI (p.120) indicates 
that as a priority, CYF’s outcomes should be focused 
on preventing the recurrence of harm and child and 
youth reoffending. CYF openly states in its 2005 
SOI that it should not be expected to be a broadly 
focused family support service or to lead community 
development.
CYF has attempted to defi ne its outcome indicators 
in the last two years, but has not yet completed this 
task. Of the seven outcome statements in its 2006 
SOI, only two have fi nal outcome indicators, two are 
‘works in progress’, and for the remaining three CYF 
is still searching for appropriate indicators (refer to 
Appendix 2.) It would seem that CYF has adopted its 
fi nal outcome indicators for their ready measurability, 
such as the rate of re-substantiation of abuse, and rates 
of offending and reoffending. These are essentially short-
term measures, indicating that the drive for MFO has 
resulted in a scaling back of the department’s intent and 
in reporting which focuses on process rather than actual 
services or activities.
The fi nal outcome indicators do not acknowledge that 
there are many external factors that have an impact on 
the effectiveness of CYF’s interventions. As in CYF’s 
case, so too in many departments: it is common for 
many outputs to contribute to the achievement of a 
single outcome. Although CYF is the lead agency, the 
very nature of child care and protection work requires 
co-operation across different agencies, communities and 
families. The success of this work depends on how well 
all parties work together (Walker, 2006). There is no 
attempt in the outcome indicators to refl ect the need 
for this co-operation.
This situation can only enhance the pressures on 
departmental chief executives. Usually, they are initially 
appointed for a fi ve-year term, under the terms of 
the State Sector Act 1988, s.38(1). Thus, because the 
pressure is on chief executives to produce results within 
a relatively short timeframe, they have a strong incentive 
to put in place processes that will achieve this end, and 
little encouragement to fully and genuinely consider 
longer-term results. 
CYF has had diffi culty in retaining its chief executives, 
having had four within the past seven years. In light 
of the pressures the agency is under, always with 
inadequate resourcing, and in a context of high political 
1 CYF’s SOI was included in MSD’s SOI in 2006, as CYF was in the 
process of being absorbed by the ministry. 
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risk and predominantly negative publicity (little public 
recognition is given to the effective and successful work 
it does), this may not be surprising.
Conclusion
MFO brings about a subtle but very signifi cant shift in 
accountability for outcomes, transferring the burden, 
on the face of it at least, from the political executive 
to the departments responsible for delivering outputs. 
Ultimately, accountability for policy outcomes should 
continue to rest with ministers, and in practice the 
public in New Zealand can still be expected to be 
strongly critical of ministers when things go wrong. 
People generally know little of or care less about 
distinctions between outputs and outcomes. 
It is ironic that MFO is reinforcing an emphasis 
on bureaucratic procedures when it is intended to 
more strongly focus departmental attention on the 
collaborative achievement of outcomes. This cannot 
be readily measured in many cases and attempts to 
enhance accountability by trying to do so are likely to 
succeed at the cost of oversimplifying governance and 
governmental complexities. 
The solution, if there is one, is not to try to make longer-
term outcomes rigorously measurable, as if they were 
shorter-term outputs. It should instead involve a search 
for smarter, and more politically contestable, ways of 
ensuring accountability, ways that recognise the complex 
and often necessarily ambiguous nature of many policy 
outcomes, as they become apparent over time. 
Appendix 1: Non-fi nancial performance 
indicators from MSD’s Statement of 
Intent 2006/07
Output Expense: Care and Protection 
Services
Description
This output expense includes the provision of services, 
both statutory and informal, that protect and assist 
children and young people who are in need of care and 
protection. 
Scope
The scope of this output expense includes:
• the notifi cation, investigation, and assessment of 
reports about children and young people at risk of 
physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, neglect, self-
harm, or behavioural diffi culties 
• the management of casework where Child, Youth 
and Family intervenes to achieve care and protection 
outcomes 
• the coordination of Care and Protection Family 
Group Conferences 
• support for families to improve their capacity to meet 
their care, control, and support responsibilities 
• the provision of care in the nature of foster care and 
residential services 
2004/2005
Result
Performance measures Standard
2005/2006
Standard
2006/2007
53,097 Quantity 
Number of intake notifi cations received by Child, Youth 
and Family:
 
51,500-59,700
 
71,400-78,910 
43,460 Number of intake notifi cations that require further action 
(FARs):
42,900-49,850 52,300-57,800
5,422 Number of care and protection Family Group 
Conferences:
5,150-6,000 7,080-7,830
 
4,853
Number of children and young people in care and 
protection care placements at any time during the year 
(as measured at the end of each month):
4,700-5,250 4,900-5,400
Performance Information
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• the provision of resolution services to assist achieving 
care and protection needs 
• the improvement of life outcomes of the children, 
young people and families involved. 
This output expense also includes the provision of 
services to support other statutory responsibilities of the 
Chief Executive such as reports provided to the Family 
Court under the Care of Children Act 2004.
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Timeliness
Response to notifi cations
Notifi cations allocated to a social worker for investigation 
within timeframes:
 
 
 
 
97.8% Critical – within 24 hours 95%-100% 95%-100%
95.9% Very Urgent – within 48 hours 95%-100% 90%-95%
 Action taken at sites by a social worker to establish the 
immediate safety of the child or young person, and to 
confi rm the response time and further action required, 
within timeframes:
  
51% Urgent – within 7 days 50%-85% 50%-85%47
62.4% Low Urgent – within 28 days 50%-85% 50%-85%
58.7% Investigations will be completed in a timely manner 70% in 90 days 
if FAR received 
is less than 
48,050. 70% 
in 120 days if 
FAR is 48,050 
or more
70% in 90 
days
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FREE FROM ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT
FINAL OUTCOME 
INDICATOR
PROPOSED OUTCOME 
INDICATOR
To prevent the recurrence of child 
abuse, neglect and insecurity of 
care
Re-substantiation of abuse, 
neglect or insecurity of care.  
That the effects of harm are 
addressed
 
An appropriate indicator is being 
investigated. 
Our review of last year’s indicator 
“FGC plans/FWAs/Court Orders 
completed and objectives met” has 
found that while we capture data 
on this indicator, it does not 
appropriately measure progress 
towards this outcome. 
An appropriate indicator is being 
investigated. 
To prevent the fi rst occurrence of 
abuse, neglect or insecurity of care
 
Our review of last year’s indicator 
“Percentage of cases that are referred 
to a third party organisation (prior to 
investigation) that are not re-notifi ed” 
has found that while we capture 
this data, the indicator itself does 
not appropriately measure progress 
towards this outcome.
To restore or improve wellbeing 
(including achieving permanency 
and stability) 
 
Improvement in developmental 
milestones (including for children in 
care) along educational attainment, 
behaviour and health dimensions.
 
Proportion (%) of children in care 
placed with their family or whanau.
Proportion (%) of cases in which 
the objectives of permanency plans 
are met.
Outcome Indicators
Appendix 2: Outcome Indicators for CYF from MSD’s Statement of Intent 2006/07
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CHILDREN AND YOUNG 
PEOPLE FREE FROM 
OFFENDING
FINAL OUTCOME 
INDICATOR
PROPOSED OUTCOME 
INDICATOR
To reduce the rate and severity of 
child and youth offending
Rate of offending 
Rate of re-offending
Severity of re-offending 
 
To hold young people to account 
for offending
 
Victim perception of whether the 
offender has been held to account 
for their offending following the 
Family Group Conference (FGC)
Offender perception of whether 
they have been held to account for 
their offending following the FGC
To restore or improve wellbeing
 
An appropriate indicator is being 
investigated. 
Our review of last year’s proposed 
indicator “The objectives of the 
Youth Justice FGC or Court Order 
have been met” has found that this 
indicator does not appropriately 
measure progress towards this 
outcome.
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